No, there is no such thing as a universal morality, and it is somewhat surprising that people are still asking this question in the 21st century. Then again, that doesn’t mean that anything goes, a la moral relativism. Of course, much depends on what one means by “universal,” so let’s try to parse things out a bit.

To begin with, if by “universal” we mean that morality is like the laws of physics, or like mathematical theorems, or perhaps like the laws of logic, then forget it. Setting aside interesting discussions on the nature of mathematics and logic and whether even their tenets are truly universal or not, morality isn’t even in the ballpark.

“Morality” comes from the Latin moralis, the word used by Cicero to translate the Greek êthos. The Latin word refers more properly to the habits and customs of a people, while the Greek one is related to the idea of character. So “morality” is concerned with people’s characters and how we interact with each other in society.

 “…ethics has to do with how to arrive at as harmonious social interactions as it is humanly possible.”

Indeed, the modern, especially Western, secular conception of morality as having to do with a universal code of behavior, with Right and Wrong (note the capitalization) is a recent phenomenon, mostly to be traced to the Enlightenment and particularly to the figure of Immanuel Kant. And that’s not a good thing, unfortunately.

Kant wanted to put moral philosophy on the same firm footing that Newton had provided for natural philosophy (what we today call science, though at the time it was mostly physics). And he thought he could do that by sheer force of reason. Rejecting — rightly — any divine inspiration on the matter, Kant arrived at what he thought was a universal logic of morality, his famous categorical imperative: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” Kantian deontology (i.e., duty-based ethics) has all sorts of specific problems, well known to philosophers, but the most fundamental one is that moral philosophy is nothing like physics. Or logic.

Rather, the ancient Greeks and Romans were far closer to the mark: ethics has to do with how to arrive at as harmonious social interactions as it is humanly possible, and this can be done in a variety of different ways, which is why Socrates at one point said that what goes in Athens does not go in Sparta, and vice versa.

This begins to sound suspiciously like moral relativism, though, and yet very few of the ancients would fall under that category (except the Sophists, the precursors of both modern lawyers and of radical postmodernists…). What saved ancient ethics from relativism, and what will save us more than two millennia later, if we stop listening to Kant (or John Stuart Mill, or a lot of other modern moral philosophers) is the existence of human nature.

Socrates, the Stoics, the Epicureans, the Cynics, and a number of other Greco-Roman schools agreed on one thing: human beings are a particular type of animal, and that particularity lies chiefly in two aspects of what it means to be human: we are highly social, and we are capable of reason.

The first bit means that we are all deeply inter-dependent on other people. Despite the fashionable nonsense, especially in the United States, about “self-made men” (they are usually men), there actually is no such thing. Without social bonds and support our lives would be, as Thomas Hobbes famously put it, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. The second bit, the one about intelligence, does not mean that we always, or even often, act rationally. Only that we have the capability to do so. Ethics, then, especially (but not only) for the Stoics becomes a matter of “living according to nature,” meaning not to endorse whatever is natural (that’s an elementary logical fallacy), but rather to take seriously the two pillars of human nature: sociality and reason. As Marcus Aurelius put it, “Do what is necessary, and whatever the reason of a social animal naturally requires, and as it requires.” (Meditations, IV.24)

There is something, of course, the ancients did get wrong: they, especially Aristotle, thought that human nature was the result of a teleological process, that everything has a proper function, determined by the very nature of the cosmos. We don’t believe that anymore, not after Copernicus and especially Darwin. But we do know that human beings are indeed a particular product of complex and ongoing evolutionary processes. These processes do not determine a human essence, but they do shape a statistical cluster of characters that define what it means to be human. That cluster, in turn, constrains — without determining — what sort of behaviors are pro-social and lead to human flourishing, and what sort of behaviors don’t. And ethics is the empirically informed philosophical enterprise that attempts to understand and articulate that distinction.

This article is from TVOL’s project titled “This View of Morality: Can an Evolutionary Perspective Reveal a Universal Morality?” You can download a PDF of the project [here], comment on this article below, or comment on the project as a whole in the Summary and Overview.

Published On: May 17, 2018

Massimo Pigliucci

Massimo Pigliucci

Massimo Pigliucci is the K.D. Irani Professor of Philosophy at the City College of New York. He has a background in evolutionary biology and keen interests in the philosophy of biology and of pseudoscience. His most recent book (co-edited with Maarten Boudry, Chicago Press) is Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. Massimo blogs regularly at

Do you think there is a universal morality?


  • Mark Sloan says:

    I am delighted you could participate and have enjoyed reading your work for years.
    Your statement “…ethics has to do with how to arrive at as harmonious social interactions as it is humanly possible” is at least close to being consistent with modern science’s and Protagoras’ (in Plato’s dialog of the same name) claims that the function of morality (the primary reason it exists) is morality enables us to live in cooperative societies.
    Do you agree with modern science and Protagoras on morality’s function? If so, then it seems at least possible there is a necessary, and thus universally moral, component of strategies that fulfil this complicated function. That is, universally moral because it is a necessary component of cooperation strategies relevant to morality, rather than universally moral because it is somehow universally binding.
    I understand virtue ethics to be an answer to the broad, important question “How should I live?” rather than just about social interactions. Couldn’t morality as cooperation (which is limited to social interactions) and virtue ethics be complimentary?
    Then whether we look to morality as cooperation or virtue ethics for guidance for refining cultural moral codes (about interactions with others) could be a question of which choice can be expected to best meet our needs and preferences. Or perhaps which best follows “nature and reason” as I have read virtue ethics is intended to do.

  • David Sloan Wilson says:

    Massimo–Your commentary is elegant, as usual. Even though it has been placed in the “No” category, it also could have been placed in the “Yes” category based on your pull quote: “Ethics has to do with how to arrive at as harmonious social interactions as it is humanly possible.”

    I love your point about systematizers such as Kant being on the wrong track by emulating Newton. It’s interesting that neoclassical economics is on the same wrong track by trying to create a “physics of social behavior”. That’s why the shift to an evolutionary perspective is such a paradigmatic change. But here is a question for you: Were not the ancient Greek philosophers also systematizers? Why are their philosophical systems closer to a modern Darwinian view than the philosophers of the 18th and 19th century?

    Now that I think about it, your statement “we are highly social, and we are capable of reason” might indicate something that the ancient philosophers got wrong. In his wonderful book “Orality and Literacy”, Walter Ong suggests that the advent of writing was transformational for human thought, allowing for ways of systematic thinking that were impossible when everything known had to be stored in human heads. This means that the moral systems of oral societies might certainly qualify as “highly social” but not so much “capable of reason”. It also means that large elements of modern moral systems might not require much reason. I look forward to developing this line of thought…

    I also love your point that a universal morality does not mean “the same behavior performed in all cultures”. What goes in Athens does not go in Sparta. What’s universal is the rule “do what it takes to construct a harmonious society”. Following that rule will result in moral systems that are diverse in their particulars, for both adaptive and historical reasons. I made this point in my own commentary and my comments on some of the other commentaries.

  • Per what I’ve said on Massimo’s blog, Cicero himself reinforces the cultural basis of morality.

    Cicero derived “moralis” from “mos,” the Latin word for “custom,” probably best known from Cicero’s own bon mot “O tempora, o mores.”


    To D.S. Wilson — the existence of human culture, and general ideas of human cultural evolution, per the likes of Laland, are universal. No individual human culture, nor anything outside the idea of “do not kill,” which itself is vague and from early human cultural evolution, disputed as to its details and its application, has a major ethical idea that is itself universal.

    And, is “creating a harmonious society” a matter of ethics? If it is, many would argue that harmony based on Bentham’s Panopticon or ideas from Huxley’s “Brave New World” are immoral. I think that it’s a-moral in the proper sense that, unless specific moral issues are involved, societal harmony is not itself a moral issue.

  • Steve Davis says:

    Massimo’s statement – “So “morality” is concerned with people’s characters and how we interact with each other in society” – is too nebulous to be of value.

    Peter Kropotkin examined these issues at length in his great work “Ethics”, which seems to have been ignored by philosophers while the flawed mutterings of Thomas Hobbes are seen as profound.

    Kropotkin found that moral standards are developed to protect the group or the society from disintegration, as in proscribing murder, rape, adultery, theft etc.

    As such, moral standards have evolutionary significance to the extent that they protect the group from selective pressures. If the moral standards are deficient, the group may fail.

  • Truth Hurts says:

    Falsehood. Human beings are entangled with their egos, instead of serving authentic values. Morality must be universal and objective to be meaningful and valid – applying to everyone at all times. Otherwise genocides, honor killings, female mutilation, etc can go on in the name of someone else’s morality.

    There is universal law and there is universal morality. For example: love your family, return favors, be fair, respect other’s property, etc. Any meaningful kind of morality must be universal. If everyone is free to follow their own rules, then there are effectively no rules at all.

  • Not so fast Massimo Piglucci. There are plenty of other social animals. And other animals appear to act rationally, in the sense of using efficient means to achieve their ends, plus most animals avoid harming themselves. There are many competing philosophical versions of morality as there are competing religious versions of morality, but nothing that all people at all times accept, nothing definitive. Why not bypass philosophy and religion and look at the unique biology, especially the ethology of humans. Perhaps that is where we will find something common to all humans. Let’s ask ourselves this question: Why can’t humans live without a moral system and animals can? Animals thrive without morality but amoral humans often end up destroying themselves and sometimes their entire society. Psychopathic apes are not a problem in ape society they are the alpha dominants. When a new alpha male gorilla takes over he kills his rival’s infants. Humans have more children, and human children have longer childhoods, with longer periods of neuroplasticity because they are protected by moral systems. Humans flourish and have more advanced cooperation because they live in a moral system. All moral systems are constraints on dominance and ways of excluding bullies and cheaters from social life. The social virtues and moral principles can thrive and develop because a moral system is already in place.

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